Current Investigation

Hereford and Worcester Fire and Rescue Service

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START HEREThis investigation is built around one simple issue:This is not about a lack of money.
It is about how that money was used.Over the past 15 years, Hereford and Worcester Fire and Rescue Service has:• Removed fire engines
• Reduced firefighter numbers
• Closed stationsThese decisions were repeatedly described as unavoidable.At the same time, the Service:• Purchased multiple fleets of Land Rover and Volvo SUVs
• Spent millions on officer response vehicles
• Continued replacing those vehicles on a fixed cycle
• Maintained a large management structureThese decisions were not described as unavoidable.They were described as “cost neutral” and “good value”.This creates a simple contradiction:If money was so limited, why did this continue?—WHAT THIS ISThis is an independent investigation based entirely on:• The Service’s own financial accounts
• Internal reports and strategy documents
• Procurement and decision records
• Freedom of Information responses—WHAT THIS SHOWSThe issue is not a funding problem.
It is a priorities problem.—WHERE TO STARTChoose how you want to read it:• Key Questions — the most direct and challenging points
• Executive Summary — a quick overview of the findings
• Summary Report — a structured breakdown of the evidence
• Full Report — the complete investigation with full detail

This investigation into HWFRS examines what money was spent, what was reduced, and what was protected.

• HWFRS Key Questions
• HWFRS Key Facts
• HWFRS Executive Summary
• HWFRS Summary Report
• HWFRS Full Report
• Questions to ask Management
• FOI Tracker

Documents

CURRENT LIST OF FOI REQUESTS

FOI 364 — Officer Vehicle Fleet (Volvos), Costs, Fit-Out, Running Costs, and Decommissioning
FOI 365 — Current Uniformed Personnel Numbers (2025)
NO FOI NUMBER — Historical Uniformed Personnel Numbers (2000–2024)
FOI 368 — 20–25 Year Timeline of Officer Vehicle Types and Approval Decisions
FOI 366 — Officer Mobilisations and Command Activity (5-Year Breakdown)
FOI 369 — Uniformed Personnel in Office-Based, Non-Operational and Temporary Roles
FOI 370 — Resilience Shift Costs (Overtime Cover)
FOI 374 — Mobilisations and Command Activity for Station Commander and Above
FOI 375 — Senior Officer Pay (Past Five Years)
FOI 379 — Evidence for Change from Standard Cars to Land Rover 4x4 Fleet (2008–2012)
FOI 378 — Evidence Supporting 4x4 / SUV Specifications for Officer Response Cars
FOI 396 — Resilience Shift Breakdown by Rank (Follow-Up to FOI 370)
FOI 389 — Procurement Process for Volvo XC60 Fleet
FOI 390 — Officer Vehicle Replacement Planning (April 2026)
FOI 391 — Procurement Activity for 2026 Officer Vehicles
FOI 392 — Fleet Strategy and 2026 Officer Vehicle ReplacementFOI 412 — Governance Oversight – Officer Structure and Officer Vehicle Fleet
FOI 420 — Clarified FOI – Officer Vehicle Replacement Planning and Internal Documents
FOI 408 — HWFRS Budget Reports and Financial Information (2008–2012)
FOI 407 — Officer and Firefighter Numbers (20–25 Year Timeline)
FOI 410 — Procurement and Costs of Land Rover Discovery Sport Officer Vehicles (2012–2018)
FOI 411 — Use of Procurement Frameworks for Officer Vehicles (2010–2024)
FOI 415 — Procurement of Officer Cars, SUVs and Ancillary Fleet Vehicles (2010–2025)
FOI 416 — Officer Vehicle Decisions (2010–2025)
FOI 418 — Revenue Contributions to Capital (RCCO) 2010/11–2023/24
FOI 417 — Information on 2018 Volvo XC60 Officer Response Vehicles
FOI 423 — Euro NCAP Safety Claims (2019 & 2021 Justifications)
FOI 426 — Service Reductions, Closures and Budget Cuts Since 2010
FOI 436 — Four-Year Replacement Cycle (Establishment & Origin)
FOI 437 — Senior Staff Vehicle Provision (Governance & Review 2011–Present)
FOI 440 — Legal Compliance Assurance for Officer SUV Procurement (2011–2026)
FOI 457 — Officer Establishment, Workforce Ratios and Budgetary ConsiderationFOI 447 — Breakdown of RCCO by Spending Category (2010/11–2023/24)
IRR — Internal Review Request (Systemic Section 12 / Aggregation Issues)
FOI 480 — PUWER Regulation 4 Compliance Assessments (2015–2022)
FOI 472 — Governance Approval for 36 Volvo XC60 Procurement
FOI 474 — Revenue Impact of Capital Expenditure Decisions (MRP / Financing Costs)
FOI 473 — Resource Reviews, Establishment Reviews & Strategic Planning Documents (2015–2024)
FOI 475 — Capital Financing Methodology – Inconsistent Treatment (Appliances vs Vehicles)
FOI 476 — Reconciliation of Officer Land Rover Fleet Numbers (2010–2019)
FOI 490 — Early Land Rover Freelander Use
FOI 492 — 2009 Decision to Introduce 4x4 Vehicles for Responding OfficersFOI 501 — Refined FOI – Staffing Reviews Since 2010
FOI 491 — Use of “Routine Replacements (4WD)” Capital Budget Category (2009/10–2012/13)
FOI 505 — Officer Vehicle Replacement Timetable – 2016 Fleet Strategy
FOI 506 — Officer Vehicle Lifecycle Policy & Planned Replacement Dates (2014/2018/2022)
FOI 507 — Clarification of “100% NCAP Rating” Justification (2019 & 2021)
FOI 508 — Officer Vehicle Replacement 2026/27 (Planning Confirmation)
FOI 426 — Resubmission – Recorded Reductions from 2010/11 Onwards
FOI 522 — Officer Response Vehicle Fleet Holding (36 vs 34)
FOI 514 — Funding Structure of Officer Vehicle Capital Schemes (2018/19 & 2022/23)
FOI 521 — Chief Fire Officer Vehicle – Replacement Timing and Allocation
FOI 542 — Recording and Use of Officer Callsigns
FOI 541 — Incident Command Levels by Year (2020–2024)
FOI 540 — Routine Replacement (4WD) Vehicles (2009/10–2010/11)

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARYThis review examines spending decisions made by Hereford and Worcester Fire and Rescue Service over the past fifteen years, using the Service’s own records, including financial statements, internal reports, capital programmes, fleet papers and Freedom of Information responses.Its central finding is simple.HWFRS did not just face financial pressure. It made choices about what to protect.While firefighter numbers were reduced, fire engines removed, stations closed and fire cover cut, the Service maintained a large management structure and continued a long-running officer vehicle programme that has cost millions of pounds of public money.The evidence shows that this was not a minor fleet issue. It was a sustained spending priority.From 2010 onwards, HWFRS moved from standard lower-cost officer cars to premium four-wheel-drive SUVs, first through Land Rover vehicles and later through repeated full-fleet Volvo XC60 replacement cycles. These purchases were presented as routine, necessary and cost-effective. But the Service’s own records raise serious questions about those claims.The documentary record suggests that the officer vehicle programme began under a capital budget line described as “Routine Replacements (4WD)”. That classification appears to have allowed a major policy change to develop without the level of scrutiny normally expected for a move from standard estate cars to higher-cost SUVs. Later reviews and procurement papers then repeatedly justified continued upgrades using standards, assumptions and cost comparisons that changed depending on the preferred vehicle.Across successive replacement cycles, the same pattern appears:
the vehicle class was assumed rather than openly tested;
cheaper alternatives were excluded or restricted;
specifications were written in ways that narrowed the outcome;
financial comparisons used inconsistent methods;
and justifications were developed around decisions already taking shape.This mattered because the vehicle programme did not sit in isolation.At the same time that these fleets were being protected and replaced, frontline capability was being reduced. Firefighter numbers fell sharply. Appliances were removed. Station availability was cut. Yet there is no equivalent evidence in the records of serious scrutiny being applied to the scale of the management structure or the continued cost of officer cars.The review also finds a wider contradiction at the heart of HWFRS’s financial narrative.For years, the Service has publicly stated that cuts to frontline services were unavoidable because money was limited. But its own accounts and capital plans show a more complex reality. Revenue money was transferred into capital. Borrowing was used to purchase vehicle fleets. Future replacement cycles were built into capital planning. The result was that officer vehicle costs became less visible in year-to-year public debate, even though the revenue budget still carried the long-term burden through financing costs, debt repayment and associated running costs.In simple terms, the cost was not removed. It was moved.The Service itself later acknowledged, in its 2024 Resource Review, that reducing capital assets such as fire engines lowers capital financing costs and relieves pressure on the revenue budget. Yet only weeks later, it retained a further £1.66 million allocation for the next officer car replacement cycle. That is not consistent with a claim that there was no alternative. It is evidence of a different priority.This review also examines whether the size of the officer structure is supported by operational need. Here too, the evidence is weak. HWFRS has been unable to provide clear data showing how often senior officers are genuinely required at incidents, how often they actually take command, or whether the scale of the officer structure reflects measured operational demand. More than half of Watch Commanders are not in frontline station roles, yet the Service continues to maintain an extensive officer hierarchy while reducing operational capacity elsewhere.Taken together, the records point to a clear conclusion.HWFRS did not simply have a funding problem. It had a priorities problem.The issue was not that money did not exist. The issue was where that money was directed, what was protected from scrutiny, and what was repeatedly presented to the public as unavoidable.This review therefore concludes that frontline reductions were not just the result of financial necessity. They were also the result of management choices. Over time, HWFRS protected management structures and officer vehicle spending while exposing firefighters, appliances and public fire cover to repeated cuts.That is the central issue examined in this report.

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QUESTIONS TO CHALLENGE MANAGEMENT
• The Service is about to replace its officer car fleet. What is the total cost of this decision?
Answer: £1.66 million for 36 vehicles, funded through borrowing over four years, with additional interest costs.• How much has the Volvo officer vehicle programme cost since 2018?
Answer: Approximately £2.4–£3 million across the 2018 and 2022 fleets, with a further £1.66 million planned for 2026.• What has the total officer vehicle programme cost since 2010?
Answer: Approximately £6–£8 million.• Where is the original decision or business case approving the move from 2WD to 4WD vehicles?
Answer: No clear recorded decision has been produced.• What operational evidence demonstrates these vehicles are necessary?
Answer: No clear operational evidence has been provided.• How many Level 2 and Level 3 incidents occur each year?
Answer: The Service has stated this data is not held.• How often do senior officers take command at incidents?
Answer: The Service cannot clearly evidence this.
• Why does the Service operate with roughly one officer for every two firefighters?
Answer: No clear evidence-based justification has been provided.• Why has the management structure not reduced in line with firefighter cuts?
Answer: No clear explanation has been provided.• Why were officer vehicles described as “cost neutral”?
Answer: This is not supported by financial records.• Why are officer vehicles funded through capital and borrowing while frontline services are cut due to revenue pressure?
Answer: This reflects a funding choice, not a funding constraint.• Do you believe it is appropriate to prioritise funding for officer vehicles over firefighters and fire engines?
Answer: This is a strategic decision that requires clear justification.• What has been presented to the Fire Authority about the true cost of these vehicles?
Answer: Evidence shows inconsistencies between reported and actual costs.• Why were Discovery Sport vehicles replaced after only two years?
Answer: No clear evidence of failure or justification has been provided.• Why was a vehicle purchase approved before the 2021 review process was completed?
Answer: Records show approval was signed before the review was finalised.• Why were different financial models used when comparing vehicles in 2015 and 2017?
Answer: Different methods were used which changed the outcome of cost comparisons.• Why were cheaper vehicle types (such as standard cars or estates) not properly considered?
Answer: Procurement processes were restricted to SUV-type vehicles.• What evidence shows officers require permanently allocated vehicles rather than a pool system?
Answer: No clear evidence has been provided.• How many officer vehicles are in use compared to frontline fire engines?
Answer: Approximately 36 officer vehicles compared to around 35 frontline pumping appliances.• Why are officer vehicles not clearly marked as emergency service vehicles?
Answer: They are typically unmarked and not visibly identifiable as fire service vehicles.• What is the total cost of borrowing and interest linked to officer vehicle fleets?
Answer: Over time, this adds millions in additional cost to the revenue budget.• Why does the Service not record data needed to justify key operational claims?
Answer: The Service has stated multiple datasets are not held.

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Key Facts• In February 2026, HWFRS FRA increased council tax by 4.89%• In that same year, 8 fire engines were removed from service• In that same year, £1.66 million was committed to new officer vehicles⸻• HWFRS currently operates 36 officer cars compared to 35 frontline fire engines• Since 2010, the officer vehicle programme has cost approximately £6–8 million of public money• Over the same period, firefighter numbers have fallen, stations have closed, and appliance availability has reduced• Full fleets of 36 vehicles have been replaced every 3–4 years during a period of claimed financial pressure• Officer vehicles have been funded through borrowing, capital budgets and revenue transfers, creating long-term costs to the same budget used to fund firefighters• Vehicle costs were moved into capital budgets, reducing visibility while still creating ongoing pressure on the revenue budget• The Service operates with roughly one officer for every two firefighters• More than half of Watch Commanders are not based on fire stations and do not routinely respond to incidents• No clear operational evidence has been produced to justify the requirement for premium SUV officer vehicles• Officer vehicles have been repeatedly described as “cost neutral” despite long-term financing costs• At the same time frontline services were reduced, management structures and officer vehicle spending were protected